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Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
Avoiding protectionist  measures by  establishing production  facilities  in  the 
protectionist country is one of the oldest explanations for foreign direct invest- 
ment (FDI). Recent papers have added a new extension to this traditional “tar- 
iff-jumping” explanation to analyze the possibility that the threat of protection 
may induce FDI. One explanation is that, as the probability of protection rises, 
foreign firms may engage in more FDI, ceteris paribus, to establish a presence 
in the host country as an insurance policy in case protectionist barriers arise. 
This anticipatory tariff jumping may be especially important since there may 
be a substantial lag in establishing a plant in the host country and a firm may 
lose substantial market share if it does not have a plant in the host country 
when protectionism is put into place. The majority of  papers on protection- 
induced FDI, however, have hypothesized that foreign firms (andor govern- 
ments) use FDI as a quid pro quo for a lower future threat of protection. 
The concept of quid pro quo FDI was formally introduced by  Bhagwati 
(1985) and refined in  subsequent papers, including  Bhagwati et al. (1987), 
Dinopoulos (1989), Wong (1989), Dinopoulos and Wong (1991), Dinopoulos 
(1992),  and Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992). Grossman and Helpman 
(1994) is the most recent and fully specified analysis of this idea. In short, the 
quid pro quo hypothesis is that a firm may decide to invest in a foreign country 
(even at a loss potentially) to reduce the “threat” of protection in future periods 
to keep its export markets open. There have been a number of instances in 
which it is quite clear that the Japanese have offered FDI as a quid pro quo to 
avert U.S. protectionism. One of  the most recent and obvious examples is the 
U.S.-Japan deal that averted a trade war in automobiles and automobile parts 
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in June 1995. When faced with prohibitive tariffs on luxury automobiles, Japa- 
nese automakers promised substantial expansions of their automobile plants in 
the United States-an  interesting concession since the main issue was suppos- 
edly access of U.S. firms to the Japanese market. However, there may be rea- 
sons to believe that induced FDI is not a general phenomenon. In particular, 
Dinopoulos (1989) shows that one primary reason quid pro quo FDI may not 
occur is the existence of a free-rider problem. Specifically, if one foreign firm 
invests in an export market to reduce protectionist pressure, all firms in the 
industry that export to the same market may benefit. The larger the free-rider 
problem, the less likely quid pro quo FDI, and the problem may preclude the 
phenomenon from arising. For this reason, testing whether the threat of protec- 
tion affects FDI flows is important and relevant. 
Despite the solid theoretical work in this area, only one other known paper 
has empirically explored the relation between FDI and the threat of protection. 
Azrak and Wynne  (1995) test  whether the predicted probability  that a US. 
antidumping  case will reach  a final affirmative  decision  against a Japanese 
product  affects quarterly Japanese  manufacturing  FDI in the United  States. 
Azrak and Wynne run into a common problem with empirical analysis of FDI: 
extremely aggregated data. Using fifty-eight observations over fourteen years 
of manufacturing FDI, they find modest support that the probability of protec- 
tion affects FDI flows. 
This paper extends Azrak and Wynne in numerous ways. First, observations 
of  Japanese FDI into the United States across four-digit  Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) manufacturing  industries from 1981 to  1988 are used to 
test a number of hypotheses that arise from the theory of protection-induced 
FDI. Since antidumping (AD) and escape clause (EC) investigations are often 
targeted at very specific products, it makes sense to analyze the threat of pro- 
tection from these sources at a much more disaggregated industrial level.’ 
Unlike previous analysis, this paper is careful to estimate separately the ef- 
fect of  tariff jumping of actual protection  as distinguished from FDI that is 
induced by the threat of protection. Separate estimation of these two different 
types of FDI is important for two reasons. First, induced FDI has potentially 
different welfare implications than tariff jumping of actual protection. Second, 
there is quite likely a correlation between industries with actual protection in 
place and those with high predicted probabilities of protection. Estimation us- 
ing only one of these as an explanatory variable may lead to biased conclusions 
since it does not allow separate identification of the two different effects.z 
1. For example, It may be more difficult to discern the effect of an affirmative case on Japanese 
cyanuric acid imports on manufacturing FDI than it is to discern the case’s effect on cyanuric acid’s 
associated four-digit SIC industry, Cyclic Organic Crudes and Intermediates. 
2. Azrak and Wynne (1995) looked at the effect of the threat of protection in isolation, without 
modeling the effects of protection in place. By not controlling for actual protection, which is most 
likely highly correlated with greater probability of protection, it is not clear whether their signifi- 
cant results lend support for induced FDI or tariff jumping. 57  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
Finally, we address whether induced FDI is due to anticipatory tariff jump- 
ing or quid pro quo considerations. Whereas Azrak and Wynne model FDI as 
a function of the threat of protection, quid pro quo theory maintains that the 
threat of protection is a function of  lagged FDI as well. Thus, we model and 
test this second connection between FDI and the threat of protection. To further 
identify when quid pro quo FDI occurs, we note that political motivations be- 
hind FDI behavior can be gleaned by the type of  FDI a foreign firm engages in 
and the type of  protection foreign firms may be able to defuse with FDI. The 
type of FDI matters because acquisition FDI may be more likely to create ill 
will than to defuse protectionist pressure in the host country industry. The type 
of protection matters because political factors have been  shown to influence 
EC investigations more than AD investigations. Thus, quid pro quo influences 
should be especially strong in nonacquisition FDI flows with respect to EC in- 
vestigations. 
Our empirical analysis confirms at the four-digit SIC level that the threat of 
protection strongly influences Japanese FDI into the United States. In fact, our 
estimates find that the threat of protection effect on Japanese FDI flows rivals 
the effect of actual protection on these flows. In addition, our results suggest 
that quid pro quo intentions play a major role in this response of  FDI to the 
threat of protection. First, the threat of protection substantially increases non- 
acquisition FDI, the type of FDI that would be appropriate to defuse a protec- 
tionist threat, but has little effect on acquisition FDI. Second, nonacquisition 
FDI has a stronger response to the threat of EC protection than it does to the 
threat of AD protection. Again, this suggests that threat-responding FDI is po- 
litically motivated since EC investigations are more likely to be responsive to 
political  appeasement. Finally, our estimates are able to determine when FDI 
is successful in defusing the threat of protection in future periods. Not surpris- 
ingly, the strongest evidence for successful quid pro quo FDI is when firms use 
nonacquisition FDI to defuse the threat of EC protection. 
The paper is organized in four sections. Section 3.1 briefly reviews the liter- 
ature on quid  pro quo FDI and presents  testable hypotheses  of  the relation 
between the threat of protection and FDI. Section 3.2 presents the econometric 
model and data used to test the hypotheses presented in section 3.1. Section 
3.3 gives results, and section 3.4 concludes. 
3.1  The Effect of a Protectionist Threat on FDI: Testable Implications 
The quid pro quo FDI hypothesis rests on the assumption that foreign firms 
and/or governments believe that they can use FDI to defuse the threat of protec- 
tion in future periods by  appeasing  special interest groups in the potentially 
protectionist country. Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992) indicate a num- 
ber of different ways in which FDI may reduce the probability  of protection. 
On the one hand, it may be directed at gaining the goodwill of the host coun- 
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products manufactured  by  foreign firms will be more palatable  to the host 
government if they are produced using host country labor. On the other hand, 
quid pro quo FDI may  be intended to placate the groups who are potential 
“demanders” of  protection.  These potential  demanders include  firms, labor 
unions, and townskommunities in the host country that may be affected by 
increased import penetration  and organized enough to lobby the government 
for protection. In this respect, Wong (1989) presents a model that specifically 
models labor union behavior and its lobbying efforts for protection, where em- 
ployment levels of its members are endogenously determined by import pro- 
tection and FDI. 
Sometimes it may be difficult to identify which groups quid pro quo FDI is 
intended to appease. For example, Japanese automotive firms geographically 
located U.S. production in areas that did not have unionized automotive work- 
ers. Thus, in this instance, appeasement of labor must not have been a goal of 
these Japanese firms. There is the additional question of whether FDI is quid 
pro quo to the specific industry or a more broad appeal to the host government, 
regardless  of the specific industry’s view of the FDI. This depends on how 
large a role a specific industry can play in host government protection. Given 
U.S. protectionist  laws, under which industries petition for relief in a formal 
process, one would guess that appeasement of the industry (if not its industry 
groups) would be a primary goal of the quid pro quo FDI. In summary, quid 
pro quo FDI implies the following general relation between FDI flows and the 
threat of protection: 
(1) 
This leads to the following testable hypotheses: 
Hypothesis  I:  FDI flows from a foreign country are positively affected by 
the perceived  threat of protection  to its export markets in the host country: 
threat,_, +  FDI,. 
Hypothesis  2:  FDI  defuses  the  future  probability  of  protection:  FDI, + 
threat,, ,. 
threat,-, +  FDI, -+  threat,,,. 
We decompose the quid pro quo theory in these two hypotheses for the fol- 
lowing reason. First, it highlights that there is an inherent lag to the process. 
This represented lag structure is not an artificial construct, but empirically im- 
portant. The threat of protection  variable is lagged one period  from FDI in 
hypothesis  1 since it is assumed that it takes a period for a foreign firm to 
change its level of FDI in response to changes in the threat of protection. Given 
the significant lag in establishing new or additional FDI, this is appropriate 
even if the length of one period is a year. Furthermore, it will take time for FDI 
to appease special interest groups lobbying for protection in an industry and 
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firms to become involved in the host country industry and be able to influence 
its political ma~hinery.~ 
A second reason  for two separate hypotheses is that, whereas hypothesis 
1 is compatible with either quid pro quo FDI or anticipatory tariff jumping, 
hypothesis 2 allows a separate test for quid pro quo intentions only. When 
increased FDI is observed in response to a rising protectionist threat in the host 
country (hypothesis l), is it because the foreign firms believe that they can 
defuse the protectionist threat and continue exporting in future periods, or is it 
because they anticipate future protection and want to get established in the host 
country by  the time the protection is in place? The former is quid pro quo 
FDI, the latter anticipatory tariff jumping. Anticipatory tariff jumping may be 
important since there may  be a substantial lag in establishing a plant in the 
host country and a firm may lose substantial market share if it does not have a 
plant in the host country before protectionism is in place. Disentangling which 
intention motivates the foreign firm to engage in FDI in the face of rising pro- 
tectionism is difficult, and the firm may be motivated by both.4 
One drawback of testing hypothesis 2 is that it can determine whether quid 
pro quo FDI is occurring only if quid pro quo FDI is successful. Specifically, 
FDI may be offered with quid pro quo intentions, but it may not be successful 
in attaining a lower threat of protection. Thus, failure to find a negative correla- 
tion between the threat of protection and lagged FDI does not necessarily mean 
that FDI is not motivated by  the desire to reduce the threat of  protection; it 
means simply that it may have failed. To better explore if  there are political 
motivations behind FDI flows, we can look at what types of protectionism 
Japanese FDI responds to. Azrak and Wynne (1995) use AD decisions as an 
indicator variable to estimate the probability of protection. This paper includes 
both AD and EC  affirmative decisions as indicators.  However, AD and EC 
investigations often lead to different forms of actual protection and thus have 
potentially  varying  consequences.  In  particular,  Finger,  Hall,  and  Nelson 
(1982) describe AD investigations as following a “technical track,” whereas 
EC investigations follow a “political track.” They find that whether an EC in- 
vestigation will reach an affirmative decision and lead to actual protection de- 
pends on political factors, such as industry structure and an industry’s ability 
3. In addition, we found little correlation between current FDI and the threat of protection in 
our data, but we obtained significant results with lagged FDL 
4. Dinopoulos and Wong (1991) make a different distinction between forms of  FDI that occur 
previous to protectionism than the one made here. They distinguish between “protectionist-threat- 
responding” FDI and quid pro quo FDI. They model a Coumot-type game between foreign firms 
and domestic labor unions, in which the labor unions choose lobbying efforts to raise the probabil- 
ity of protection and foreign firms choose FDI to lower the probability. They define protectionist- 
threat-responding protecfion  as FDI by foreign firms when they are “reacting to protectionist threat 
in a Nash fashion” and quid pro quo FDI as FDI meant to “defuse the protectionist threat as a 
Stackelberg leader.” We  find this distinction unintuitive since, in both cases, the foreign firm is 
investing to lower the threat of protection. Other papers on quid pro quo FDI implicitly refer to 
both these types of FDI as quid pro quo. 60  Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
to lobby for protection. In contrast, the final decision in an AD case depends 
on technical facts that are used to determine whether there exists a difference 
between the foreign firm’s home price and its export price (i.e., dumping) and 
whether the domestic industry has been injured. It is important to note that 
the president of the United States has the final decision on whether to enact 
protectionism in the case of an affirmative EC investigation, whereas affirma- 
tive AD cases lead automatically to d~ties.~  As described above, quid pro quo 
FDI is specifically intended to affect the political process of protectionism. 
This suggests a third hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Quid pro quo FDI is more likely in the case of EC investigations 
than in AD ones. 
Testing hypothesis 3 will  allow  a distinction between  anticipatory  tariff 
jumping and quid pro quo. Specifically, with anticipatory tariff jumping, it is 
expected that the response of FDI flows with respect to higher probabilities of 
EC and AD protectionism are similar, whereas a relatively larger response to- 
ward the threat of EC protectionism is expected if FDI is affected by quid pro 
quo considerations. 
Analysis of the type of FDI in which foreign firms choose to engage may 
also provide information on the firms’ political motivations. Bhagwati, Dino- 
poulos, and Wong (1992) note that political perceptions involved with quid pro 
quo FDI can be very sensitive. For example, they admit that increased Japanese 
FDI into the United States may eventually create “ill will rather than goodwill” 
if it comes to be perceived as a threat, like import penetration. Despite this, no 
one has commented on whether certain forms of FDI may be more likely to 
appease special interest groups and are therefore more appropriate for quid pro 
quo FDI. These considerations will help distinguish between quid pro quo and 
anticipatory tariff jumping. 
Politically, it is reasonable  to expect that quid pro quo FDI would occur 
through new plants (or “greenfield” FDI), plant expansions, or joint ventures6 
rather than acquisitions, for the following reasons. First, not all acquisitions 
are “friendly,” which may increase the threat of protectionism rather than re- 
duce it. But even those acquisitions that are “friendly” may cause hostility with 
the target firm’s labor and/or community, although they may be acceptable to 
the target firm’s management. These former groups are typically not a signifi- 
cant part of the acquisition agreement. Thus, they may be hostile to the change 
in ownership and the adjustment process it implies, a process that may be even 
5.  Duties from an affirmative AD decision may not be imposed if the petitioning industry with- 
draws or suspends its petition. This may  occur in the case where the petitioning  industry and 
foreign firms have made an alternative bargain. For example, AD cases in computer chips from 
Japan in 1985 were suspended in lieu of the semiconductor agreement between the two countries. 
6.  The discussion that follows focuses only on the political difference between acquisitions and 
new plants or plant expansion. Joint ventures seem to be an obvious way to try to appease host 
country firms in the same industry, as pointed out by Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992). 61  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
more difficult because of cultural differences with new foreign owners. There- 
fore, of  the three lobby  groups  that are among the potential  demanders for 
protectionism,  acquisition FDI may appease only one group (the firm’s deci- 
sion makers) and aggravate the other two (labor and the community). However, 
these considerations may be mitigated if the target company was on the brink 
of closing and all groups connected with the target firm are aware of that re- 
ality. 
In addition, the acquisition may increase protectionist sentiments from other 
firms in the industry, who may appeal to government to prevent foreign firms 
from “buying up” their industry. This clearly was the case with the proposed 
merger of Fujitsu’s semiconductor business and Fairchild Semiconductor Cor- 
poration  in  1986. At the time, one industry analyst was quoted  in  the  Wall 
Street Journal  (27 October  1986) as saying, “Right now protectionist  senti- 
ments are mixed, and I don’t think this merger in itself will result in sanctions 
or opposition by the U.S. government. But when you have one of the best high 
tech semiconductor companies in the business sell to the Japanese, it’s got to 
raise some eyebrows. And if it’s the beginning of a trend of Japanese snapping 
up weakened U.S. companies, the government might have to respond.” 
A second contrast between acquisition and greenfield investment is related 
to the timing of job creation in the host country. The immediate effect of a new 
plant or plant expansion is the creation of new jobs and all the publicity that 
goes with the initial hiring process. The long-run effect of  greenfield invest- 
ment may mean no new jobs or even lost jobs in the overall economy if the new 
foreign plant leads to job displacement elsewhere in the industry. But uncertain 
future losses, potentially dispersed in small amounts across many firms and 
communities, may have little political weight in the face of the initial large job 
creation. Acquisitions have no such immediate positive effect. In fact, acquisi- 
tions can often bring reorganizations and accompanying immediate job losses. 
Again, the exception is a target company that is known to be on the brink of 
closure. In this instance, there may be an opportunity for the foreign company 
to play the role of the white knight and “save jobs.” 
In contrast to quid pro quo FDI, an argument can be made that anticipatory 
tariff jumping is more likely to take the form of acquisition FDI. Anticipatory 
tariff jumping implies that it is important for the firm to establish a presence 
in the market before protection is in place. However, some forms of FDI, espe- 
cially construction of a new plant (or greenfield), may take a year or longer to 
complete. Others have noted that the quickest form of  FDI is most likely an 
acquisition. Thus, with anticipatory tariff jumping, where time is apparently 
crucial, one would expect to see acquisition FDI. This discussion leads to a 
fourth testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: Quid pro quo FDI is more likely to take the form of greenfield 
FDI, while  anticipatory tariff jumping is more likely to involve acquisition 
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3.2  Empirical Model and Data 
To test hypotheses 1-4  formally, we focus on Japanese FDI into the United 
States and the role of protectionist pressure in explaining those patterns across 
manufacturing industries over time. Proponents of quid pro quo FDI have pin- 
pointed Japanese investment patterns in the United States as a likely area for 
observing the phenomenon. Bhagwati, Dinopoulos, and Wong (1992) explic- 
itly state, “There is certainly some plausible, more-than-anecdotal  evidence 
that the acceleration in Japanese DFI [direct foreign investment] in the United 
States in the early 1980’s was due to a mix of  ‘political’ reasons: some partly 
in anticipation of the imposition of protection, and others partly to defuse its 
threat” (p. 189). As they report, a survey by the Japanese Ministry of Interna- 
tional  Trade  and  Industry  (MITI)  of  Japanese  firms  undertaking  foreign 
investment  between  1980 and  1986 found  that  many  were  motivated  by 
“avoiding trade friction.” This is not surprising since trade groups in  Japan 
publicly encouraged Japanese firms to invest to lower the threat of protection 
in the United States during this time. For example, the New York Times (2 May 
1984) reported that, “fearful of trade friction, the Communications Industry 
Association of Japan, a trade group, has cautioned its members to avoid explo- 
sive increases in exports and to build factories in the United States, according 
to Haruo Ozawa, its president.” 
Japanese industrial  structure may make observation of quid pro quo FDI 
more likely as well. MITI and keiretsu industrial linkages have been cited often 
as elements in the Japanese economy that may allow a greater degree of indus- 
trial collusion there than in other developed countries. We  will test for the 
importance of keiretsu relations in the FDI decision below. By facilitating co- 
ordination of FDI and export flows, the unique Japanese institutional and in- 
dustrial structures may lessen any potential free-rider problem inherent in an 
industry faced with protectionist threats in its export markets. 
3.2.1  Econometric Model 
Testing the relation  between  FDI and the threat of  protection  is difficult 
precisely because it is impossible to measure or observe the threat of protection 
directly. However, the formal institutional  process  in the United  States that 
accompanies EC and AD protection  provides perhaps the best indication of 
when protectionist pressures in a U.S. industry are high. As successive GATT 
rounds have reduced most-favored-nation tariff rates and long-standing quota 
arrangements, EC and AD laws are the main ways that new protectionism has 
occurred in the United States in the past decades. AD and EC investigations 
also focus on very specific products and industries, which makes the threat of 
protection industry specific and thus more easily identified. Thus, an indication 
of the threat of protection is whether imports in an industry become subject to 63  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
an affirmative EC or AD decision.'  We can use this indicator variable to model 
the relation between the underlying  latent variable and explanatory variables 
by assuming that 
(2) 
where 
ZL,  = Wz,-lY  + Y,,-I? 
Z,,,-  I =  1  if Z,:,-l > 0, 
Z,,-l  = 0 if Z,',,-i < 0, 
and where Z;,,-  I is the threat of protection in industry i and year t -  1  Z,.,-, is 
the associated indicator variable of whether an affirmative AD or EC decision 
is made, W3,/-  are explanatory variables that represent industrial, political, and 
overall US. economic factors that influence the threat of  protection, y is the 
parameter  vector, and  is the error term, assumed to be N(O,l).x  Appro- 
priate estimation  of  this model can be done with a standard probit model. A 
number of studies have analyzed a similar model to help predict which indus- 
tries will have successful AD or EC investigations brought  against U.S. im- 
ports,  including  Takacs (198 l), Salvatore (1987), and Coughlin, Terza,  and 
Khalifah  (1  989). Unlike past studies, we use the model to determine whether 
previous FDI lowers the threat of protection (hypothesis  2)  by including lagged 
FDI as an explanatory variable in W,,,-  I. 
The unobservable nature of the threat of protection  also affects estimation 
of whether the threat of protection affects FDI (hypothesis  1). To test hypothe- 
sis 1, assume that Japanese FDI in industry i in year t is specified as 
where y, is an (n X  1) vector of Japanese FDI, X,,is an (n X  k) vector of  k 
explanatory variables besides the threat of protection  variable,  is a (k X  1) 
vector of coefficients, Z:,-, represents the threat of protection last period, 6 is 
its associated  coefficient,  ez,  is an (n X  1) error term, and n = i  X  t. Once 
again, the variable Z:,,-l has an asterisk associated with it because we cannot 
observe this variable; rather, we observe Z,,f-l. Whereas the latent variable is 
the dependent variable in equation (2),  the latent variable is in the explanatory 
7. Section 301 trade actions, which are neatly analyzed in Bayard aiid Elliott (1994). were also 
considered as possible indications of  a protectionist threat. However, the majority of 301 activity 
with respect to Japan has targeted market access of U.S. firms in Japan with respect to products 
that Japan does not import to the United  States (specifically, tobacco and citrus fruit producb). 
Other 301 actions with respect to Japan occurred simultaneously with an AD or EC investigation 
of the  came subject product. Thus, it would be impossible to separate out the effect of  the 301 
action from the AD or EC action we model. 
8. The variables in eq. (2)  are written as lagged variables with subscript r -  1 since this equation 
will  generate predicted probabilities of  protection to explain next-period  FDI, as predicted by 
Iheory and modeled in eq. (4)  below. 64  Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
variables of equation (3), and estimates using the observable indicator variable 
as a proxy  need not be consistent  (see Goldberger  1972; and Pagan  1984). 
However, whether the latent variable is observable to the agents being modeled 
is important for testing. In this case, the unobservable variable (the threat of 
protection) is not only unknown to the researcher but also most likely unknown 
to the agents being modeled, the foreign firms making FDI decisions. Thus, 
assuming that foreign firms use the same information set as is available to us 
(W,l in eq. [2]), the predicted  (i.e., expected) probability of protection from 
equation (2),  kz,,-l,  not the unobservable threat of  protection, Zy,,-l, is the ap- 
propriate regressor. Thus, hypothesis  1 is tested with 
(4)  Ygl  = x,p  + &-,s  + 
In summary, from estimating equation (2),  we obtain estimated predicted prob- 
abilities of filings for all industries i across all years t -  1, 22.1-,  .  Assuming that 
the error terms of the two equations are independent, this predicted probability, 
Zt  can be substituted in (4) to obtain consistent maximum likelihood esti- 
mates (see Maddala  1983, 117-23).9 
Assuming that the error terms are independent is consistent with the relation 
between the threat of protection and FDI shown in equation (I), whereby FDI 
levels and the threat of protection are not contemporaneously (i.e., simultane- 
ously) determined. Current values of each variable are affected by lagged, pre- 
determined values of the other. Provided that the threat of protection and FDI 
are not correlated with their own past values two periods before, the two equa- 
tions’ error terms are independent. Because it is more likely that noncontempo- 
raneous  correlation  exists with FDI, we correct  for this in  equation (4),  as 
described below. As mentioned, equation (2)  by itself has been the subject of 
empirical investigation, as a number of papers have modeled the probability 
that a U.S. industry will file an AD and/or an EC petition, including Takacs 
(1981), Herander and Schwartz (1984), Salvatore (1987), Coughlin, Terza, and 
Khalifah  (1989),  Moore  (1992),  Baldwin  and  Steagall  (1994),  Azrak  and 
Wynne (1993, and Hansen and Prusa (in press). Relying primarily on these 
studies and hypothesis 2, we include the following as explanatory variables in 
estimating  equation  (2): (1)  previous-period  real Japanese import growth in 
industry; (2) previous-period real domestic shipment growth of U.S. industry; 
(3) share of Japanese imports in industry i of total Japanese imports in United 
States; (4) share of Japanese imports in industry i to total imports in industry 
i; (5) union presence in U.S. industry  i; (6) industry wage to value added; (7) 
9. This situation can be contrasted with the case in  which a variable is unobservable to the 
researcher but known to the agents in the process being modeled. This is the classic case of latent 
variable estimation, where simply inserting the predictions from eq. (3) for .Z,y,-, in eq. (2) will 
lead to inconsistent standard errors in the linear setting and has unknown properties in the nonlin- 
ear setting used in this paper (see Goldberger 1972; and Pagan  1984). Because it is likely that 
foreign firms are removed from actual observation of the U.S. protectionist threat, the assumption 
used here does not seem restrictive and makes estimation more tractable. 65  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
previous period AD/CVD (countervailing  duty) investigations of other coun- 
tries’ imports in industry; (8) real U.S. GNP growth; and (9) lagged FDI. 
Variables  1, 3, and 4 capture how prominent  Japanese import penetration 
has been in the industry in absolute terms, relative to total Japanese imports in 
the United States, and relative to other countries’ imports in the industry. The 
more prominent the Japanese import penetration, the more likely a petition is 
filed by the U.S. domestic industry for relief. Variable 2 is intended to capture 
how well the U.S. industry is performing since an injury test in AD investiga- 
tions is a statutory requirement for affirmative determinations. Lower real ship- 
ment growth should raise the probability of an affirmative decision. Variables 
5 and 6 are intended to assess how prominent and powerful US.  labor interests 
are in an industry since, as Bhagwati, Dinopoulous,  and Wong (1992) point 
out, labor groups can by  a strong and important lobby group for protectionist 
pressure. Thus, a larger labor presence  should increase the likelihood  of  an 
affirmative AD or EC petition. 
Justification for including variable 7 and expecting a positive correlation is 
that, once an industry has employed substantial fixed costs for filing an initial 
case and acquiring institutional knowledge of U.S. protectionist law, the mar- 
ginal cost in future periods of filing for relief is much lower. Trade diversion 
from previous cases may also play an important role. When a number of for- 
eign countries’  imports of  a certain product  suffer AD or CVD duties, this 
competition barrier can benefit not only the U.S. industry but also the foreign 
importers that did not come under investigation. Thus, these nonsubject  im- 
ports can often increase substantially, raising the probability  that they come 
under future investigations. Finally, variable 8 relates to economy wide factors 
that may influence the likelihood  of filings across years, and variable 9 tests 
hypothesis 2. 
The theory of  FDI suggests a number of explanatory variables for equation 
(4)-in  addition to the threat variable-that  have performed well in previous 
empirical analyses. As discussed in the data section below, we use a panel data 
set of Japanese FDI in the United States across four-digit SIC manufacturing 
industries  and the years  1981-88.  Thus, the specified  explanatory  variables 
address both the cross-sectional  and the time-series dimensions of the depen- 
dent variable, Japanese FDI into the United Stateslo 
One of the more prominent theories of FDI is internalization.  Internaliza- 
tion, which arose out of the transactions  cost literature, postulates that firms 
with more firm-specific assets are more likely to engage in FDI. For these 
firms, external market transactions  with another party, such as exporting  or 
licensing, may not adequately take advantage of firm-specific assets, as would 
be the case if the transactions were internalized (i.e., setting up one’s own oper- 
10. Many empirical studies of FDI explore either theories that explain cross-sectional variation 
of FDI patterns (e.g.,  Kogut and Chang 1991) or theories that explain variations in aggregate FDI 
across years (e.g., Froot and Stein  1991; and Martin  1991). For studies that use panel data, see 
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ations in the foreign country)." To proxy Japanese industries that enjoy larger 
stocks of these firm-specific assets, we use R&D expenditures by industry and 
expect a positive coefficient.  R&D expenditures have been used by a number 
of other empirical studies similarly (e.g., Martin  1991; and Grubaugh  1987) 
and show significant explanatory power. 
Exchange rate changes have shown explanatory power in a number of empir- 
ical studies (see Swenson  1994; Ray  1989; Froot and Stein 1991; Azrak and 
Wynne 1995; and Blonigen 1995). Both Froot and Stein (1991) and Blonigen 
( 1995) present theoretical models that predict that dollar depreciations relative 
to the yen increase Japanese FDI into the United States. Thus, the yen-dollar 
exchange rate is included with an expected negative sign. 
Other studies examining foreign countries' investment patterns in the United 
States over time have included real GNP growth in the foreign country as an 
explanatory  variable  (see Ray  1989; and  Martin  1991). One would  expect 
higher  growth rates  of  overall economic activity  to be  positively  correlated 
with a country's investment both within the foreign country and abroad. Thus, 
we include Japanese real GNP growth and expect a positive sign.'* 
We also include a variable specific to Japanese economic behavior: keiretsu 
relations. Lawrence (1991, 1993) details important ways in which keiretsu rela- 
tions may influence Japanese economic activity and shows empirically that it 
has a substantial effect on the level of imports and inward FDI in Japan. The 
large horizontal keiretsus of Japan are centered around the Japanese economy's 
largest banks. One way in which firms affiliated with a keiretsu may be differ- 
ent with respect to their outward FDI behavior is perhaps through their easier 
access to and the lower cost of  external financing  because of  these keiretsu 
linkages to a major bank. In addition, Dinopoulos (1989) showed that market 
structure considerations may affect the phenomenon of quid pro quo FDI, as 
discussed  above. Thus,  we include the degree of  keiretsu linkages  across a 
Japanese industry and expect a positive sign. 
One of the oldest explanations for FDI is the avoidance of protection that is 
in place; that is, tariff-jumping. Once protectionist barriers are erected to for- 
eign imports, foreign firms invest in the protectionist country to get behind the 
tariff wall. Thus, we include a protection variable to indicate the presence of 
EC or negotiated  trade agreements  with  Japan or AD duties in place  in an 
industry on Japanese products. We assume that relative  levels of  protection 
from other sources in the U.S. economy (i.e., most-favored-nation  tariff rates 
and long-standing quotas) remain  unchanged over our sample and thus have 
no effect on changes in FDI flows over our sample. 
I  I. For example, licensing another firm in a foreign country involves "transaction,"  costs if 
12. Martin (1991)  found this variable to be statistically significant in explaining Japanese invest- 
your firm has superior marketing abilities. 
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3.2.2  Data 
To test the model, we must necessarily rely on numerous data sources, each 
with potential limitations in coverage and otherwise. The most difficult vari- 
able with respect to data is information on Japanese FDI flows into the United 
States. Credible testing of our model requires both cross-sectional detail and a 
time-series dimension, as explained above. Thus, we rely on a yearly publica- 
tion  by  the International  Trade Administration  (ITA) at the  Department  of 
Commerce (DOC), Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. The appen- 
dix of this publication contains a compiled list of FDI transactions reported in 
public sources during the year, including the type of inve~tment,'~  the foreign 
investor and country, the four-digit SIC of  the U.S. investment,14 the state in 
which it is located, and the dollar value of the transaction. The disaggregate 
nature  of  the  ITA  data (specifying  individual  observations  of  FDI by  type, 
country, and four-digit  SIC industry)  distinguishes  them from the data pub- 
lished annually by the Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) in the Survey of 
Current Business, which reports more aggregate statistics. However, the BEA 
relies on private survey data, whereas the ITA records FDI from publicly avail- 
able sources. Figure 3.1 graphs two comparable aggregate measures of Japa- 
nese FDI activity from 1979 to 1989,  with one line representing the number of 
Japanese manufacturing FDI occurrences in the United States reported by the 
ITA and the other representing a BEA measure of Japanese outlays for acquisi- 
tions and new establishments in the United States. It is easy to see that the two 
series follow each other closely (the correlation  is 0.91), suggesting that the 
ITA consistently matches the private survey data of the BEA. In addition, the 
ITA count data patterns for broad manufacturing groups were matched to BEA 
data with strong, positive correlation coefficients as well.'* 
Dollar values of  FDI are not  necessarily  a matter  of  public  record;  thus, 
dollar values for observations are reported by the ITA database only about half 
to two-thirds of the time. Thus, we specify our dependent variable in equation 
(4)  as the discrete number of FDI occurrences in a four-digit industry  i in year 
t.  To model this dependent variable correctly, we employ a discrete probability 
model,  negative  binomial,  to obtain  maximum  likelihood  estimates.16 The 
panel nature of the data is a concern as well, however, particularly serial corre- 
lation problems.  If  lagged FDI is correlated with current FDI in the sample, 
estimates need not be consistent. Thus, we assume that each industry i has its 
13. The different types of FDI that it separately identifies are acquisitions and mergers, new 
plants, joint ventures, plant expansions, reinvested earnings, equity increases, and other. 
14. With acquisitions, this means the four-digit SIC classification of  the target firm. 
15. Correlation coefficients between the two series were 0.79 for machinery, 0.73 for chemicals 
and their allied products, 0.66 for primary and fabricated metals, and 0.70 for other manufacturing. 
16. Kogut and Chang (1991) use the same database and use a negative binomial specification 
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Fig. 3.1  Measures of Japanese manufacturing FDI activity in the United States, 
1979-89 
Suurce: Bureau of  Economic Analysis (BEA) data are taken from various issues of  the Survey of 
Current Business, and the International Trade Administration (ITA) data are from the appendix of 
the annual Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. 
own unobservable  propensity  to engage in FDI, 0,. which  is independently 
and identically distributed across industries. Conditional on Oi,  FDI for a given 
industry in one period is independent of its FDI in other  period^.^' Following 
Hausman, Hall, and  Griliches (1984), assume that  the ratio  0</(1  + 0,) is 
distributed as a beta random variable with shape parameters (u, b).  Using this 
beta density, the joint probability of an industry’s acquisitions over the panel 
where y,,  = exp(Q,,n), and Q,, and T are the combined regressor matrix and 
associated coefficients, [X,,,  kt,,-  ,] and [PIS] in equation (4). Maximum likeli- 
hood techniques estimate a and b in addition to our coefficient vector, [PIS]. 
17. This assumption is similar to that used by Staiger and Wolak (1994). 69  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
Significant changes in the AD law came into place in 1980. In addition, tariff 
schedules and the SIC system underwent substantial changes in the late 1980s, 
creating consistency problems with a number of important variables across this 
time period. As a result, we limit our sample to the years  1981-88.  Missing 
observations in some explanatory variables leave a sample of  299 four-digit 
manufacturing industries over eight years.’8  The history of AD and EC investi- 
gations  against  Japanese products  during  1980-87  is listed  in table 3.1, of 
which the affirmative decisions are used as an indicator of the threat of protec- 
tion.”j A data appendix discusses  sources for the other variables used in the 
analysis. 
3.3  Results 
Our analysis begins with testing equation (2) and the hypothesis that lagged 
FDI affects the threat of protection. The predicted probabilities are then used 
in estimating equation (4) and testing the hypothesis  that FDI is affected by 
previous-period  threat of protection. After initial estimates, we test the effect 
of  different  forms of  possible  new  protection  (hypothesis  3) and different 
forms of FDI (hypothesis 4) on the estimated relations. As discussed  above, 
testing of equation (2) provides evidence of whether FDI is successful in defus- 
ing the threat of protection, while equation (4) tests whether and to what extent 
the threat of protection motivates firms to engage in FDI. 
Column 1 of table 3.2 presents initial maximum likelihood probit estimates 
of the probability of an AD or EC filing in industry i in year t -  1. Overall, the 
equation shows a good fit, as the likelihood  ratio test easily rejects the null 
hypothesis  that the coefficients of the equation are jointly zero. In addition, 
most of the explanatory variables have their expected sign. In particular, Japa- 
nese import growth and penetration  variables are all positively  related  to a 
higher probability of  protectionism in an industry. Previous-period  investiga- 
tions of other countries’ imports in the industry are highly significant as well, 
suggesting that, once the U.S. industry has incurred the fixed costs of familiar- 
izing itself with U.S.  protection  laws, it is more likely to file future petitions 
for relief and obtain protection. However, contrary to hypothesis 2, there is no 
significant relation between  lagged FDI and the threat of protection  in these 
initial estimates. 
To  test whether the type of  protection  matters  in finding a quid pro quo 
relation in equation (2),  we separately estimate the threat of EC protection and 
AD protection  in columns 2 and 3 of table 3.2. As expected, the results are 
more encouraging. In particular, with respect to the threat of EC protection, 
18. Import data for some of the four-digit industries were missing, and, in a few cases, import 
levels jumped from zero to positive levels and back again, making import growth figures noncalcu- 
lable. In addition, shipment data were missing for a couple of industries. 
19. Data used for these cases are from  1980-87, not 1981-88,  because the threat of  protection 
equation is lagged one period. Table 3.1  AD, CVD, and EC Investigations Affecting Japanese Products, 
1980-87 
Investigation 
Type  Year  Product  SIC  Decision 
AD  1980 
AD  1980 
EC  1980 
AD  1981 
AD  1981 
AD  1981 
EC  1981 
AD  1982 
AD  1982 
AD  1982 
EC  1982 
EC  1982 
EC  1982 
AD  1983 
AD  1983 
AD  1983 
AD  1983 
AD  1983 
AD  1983 
EC  1983 
AD  1984 
AD  1984 
AD  1984 
AD  1984 
AD  1984 
AD  I984 
EC  1984 
EC  1984 
EC  1984 
EC  1984 
EC  1984 







Pipes and Tubes of Iron and Steel 
Menthol 
Motor Vehicles 
Steel Wire Nails 
Amplifiers 
Stainless Steel Clad Plate 
Fishing Rods and Parts 
Seamless Steel Pipes 
High Capacity Pagers 
Portland Cement 
Tubeless Tire Valves 
Heavyweight Motorcycles 
Stainless Steel &Alloy Tool Steel 
Polyester Fabric 









Stainless Steel Wire Cloth 
Neoprene Laminate 
Cellular Mobile Phones 
Nonrubber Footwear 
Carbon & Specialty Steel Products 
Unwrought Copper 
Certain Canned Tuna 
Potassium Permanganate 
Nonrubber Footwear 
1985  Offshore Platform Jackets 
1985  Nylon Impression Fabric 
1985  64K DRAMs 
1985  EPROMs 
1985  256K DRAMs 
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Table 3.1  (continued) 
Investigation 
Type  Year  Product  SIC  Decision 
EC  1985 
EC  1985 
AD  1986 
AD  1986 
AD  1986 
AD  1986 
AD  I986 
AD  I986 
AD  I986 
AD  1986 
AD  1986 
EC  1986 
EC  1986 
AD  1987 
AD  I987 
AD  I987 
AD  I987 
AD  I987 
AD  I987 
AD  1987 
Certain Metal Castings 
Apple Juice 
Butt-weld Pipe Fittings 
Butt-weld Pipe Fittings 
Clear Glass Mirrors 
Tapered Roller Bearings 
Malleable Pipe Fittings 
Forged Steel Crankshafts 
Silica Filament Fabric 
Portland Cement 
Color Picture Tubes 
Wood Shingles and Shakes 
Steel Fork Arms 
Copier Toner 
Butt-weld  Pipe Fittings 
Forklift Trucks 
Brass Sheet and Strip 
Bimetallic Cylinders 
Nitrile Rubber 





































































Source; U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) annual reports  and concordances main- 
tained at the USITC. 
,'Despite  the negative decision by the U.S. International Trade Commission, the president imposed 
protection on this product, and thus this observation is treated  as an affirmative  decision in  the 
statistical analysis. 
FDI lagged one period and FDI lagged two periods have the expected negative 
sign, although they are statistically insignificant at the 90 percent confidence 
level. In  contrast, lagged FDI is positively  correlated  with the threat of AD 
protection, and FDI lagged one period is statistically significant at the 90 per- 
cent confidence level. This suggests either that quid pro quo FDI was unsuc- 
cessful in defusing an AD protectionist threat or that there is anticipatory tariff 72  Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
Table 3.2  Probit Estimates for Predicting Affirmative Decisions on Japanese Products 
across Four-Digit  SIC Manufacturing Industries, 1980-87 
Threat of  Threat of  EC  Threat of AD 
Protection  Protection  Protection 
Constant 
Lagged real Japanese import growth 
Lagged real domestic shipments growth 
Share of  Japanese imports to total Japanese imports 
Share of  Japanese imports to total all imports 
Union presence 
Industry wage to value added ratio 
Pact investigations of  other countries’ imports 
U.S. real GNP growth 
FDI lagged  1 
FDI lagged 2 
FDI lagged 3 
Log likelihood 
Restricted log likelihood 
Likelihood ratio test 
Observations (N) 
























-  129.48 
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-  120.35 
45.82 
2,392 
***Asymptotic t-test significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
*+ Asymptotic r-test significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
;k  Asymptotic r-test significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
jumping in the face of an AD protectionist threat. This accords with hypothesis 
3, that political appeasement is difficult with “technical track” AD investiga- 
tions. Differences in the other regressors also show that the threat of EC protec- 
tion is influenced by political factors more than the threat of  AD protection 
is. In particular, the degree of union presence and the industry wage to value 
added, both signs of labor’s political strength in an industry, are significantly 
correlated with the threat of EC protection but not with the threat of AD pro- 
tection. 
Table 3.3 explores how different forms of lagged FDI may affect the threat 73  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
of EC protection.20  Specifically, column 1 specifies lagged Japanese nonacqui- 
sition FDI, whereas column 2 lags Japanese acquisition  FDI. Hypothesis 4 
suggests that previous nonacquisition FDI should be more likely to defuse the 
threat of EC protection than acquisition FDI, and the results show some sup- 
port for this. The coefficients on nonacquisition FDI lagged one and two peri- 
ods are larger, and the one-period lag is significant at the 95 percent confidence 
level, suggesting stronger support for successful quid pro quo FDI with nonac- 
quisition FDI than with all forms of FDI in general. In further support of hy- 
pothesis 4, the coefficients on lagged acquisition FDI are statistically insig- 
nificant with respect to the threat of EC protection. The one inexplicable result 
is the  strong positive correlation  between nonacquisition  FDI three periods 
before and the threat of EC protection. 
Before discussing estimation results for equation (4), it should be noted that 
a variety  of  specifications  were tried for the dependent variable in equation 
(2). As noted earlier, our dependent variable takes the value of one when an 
investigation occurred that led to an affirmative ruling (i.e., led to protection). 
Specifying the binary variable as taking on the value of one when any investi- 
gation occurred (both those that ended in an affirmative ruling and those that 
did not) leads to similar, but slightly weaker, results. This is logical in the sense 
that foreign firms may have information that negative cases are less likely to 
lead to protection, and thus economic behavior will change less than in a case 
that will lead to an affirmative decision. We also tried specifying three options 
(no investigation, investigatiodnegative decision, and investigatiodaffirmative 
decision) with multinomial  logit and ordered logit and probit specifications. 
These specifications  led to similar, but  slightly weaker, results.  In addition, 
the various predicted probabilities generated by these models performed quite 
similarly to regressors in testing of equation (4). 
We  next  turn  to estimation  of  equation (4), using predicted  probabilities 
from equation (2)  as estimated in column 1 of table 3.2. Column 1 of table 3.4 
presents initial estimates of the Japanese FDI equation using a random effects 
negative  binomial  model. The equation shows excellent fit, as the likelihood 
ratio test easily rejects the null hypothesis that the slopes are equal to zero at 
a 99 percent confidence level. In addition, most of the traditional explanatory 
variables are of expected sign and consistent with other empirical  studies of 
FDI. In particular, the effect of movements in the exchange rate and the theory 
of internalization (as proxied by R&D expenditures) show strong support. 
With respect to this paper’s main focus, the predicted probability of protec- 
tion is positively  correlated with greater FDI activity in an industry at the 99 
percent confidence level. Actual protection in place has the expected positive 
sign  but  is statistically  insignificant. At  first  glance,  this  seems surprising. 
20. For the  sake of  brevity,  we  do not  show  how  different forms of  lagged FDI  affect  AD 
protection. However, results show that lagged acquisition FDI has a particularly strong positive 
correlation with  the  threat of AD protection, whereas this is less the case with  nonacquisition 
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Table 3.3  Probit Estimates for Predicting EC Affirmative Decisions on 
Japanese Products across Four-Digit SIC Manufacturing Industries, 
1980-87 
EC Threat of  EC Threat of 
Protection  Protection 
Constant 
Lagged real Japanese import growth 
Lagged real domestic shipments growth 
Share of Japanese imports to total Japanese imports 
Share of Japanese imports to total all imports 
Union presence 
Industry wage to value added ratio 
Pa\t investigations of other countries'  imports 
U.S. real GNP growth 
Nonacquisition FDI lagged  I 
Nonacquisition FDI lagged 2 
Nonacquisition FDI lagged 3 
Acquisition FDI lagged  1 
Acquisition FDI lagged 2 
Acquisition FDI lagged 3 
Log likelihood 
Restricted log likelihood 


























































*"'kAsymptotic t-test significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
'%*  Asymptotic f-test significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*  Asymptotic r-test significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
However, the majority of tariff jumping may occur in only the first few years 
of  new protection. If the effect of protection on FDI behavior diminishes sub- 
stantially over time, the presence of protection may not be significant in a data 
set with a time-series dimension, as used here. A second reason for insignifi- 
cance may stem once again from pooling different forms of FDI. Firms may 75  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
Table 3.4  Random Effects Negative Binomial Estimates of Japanese FDI across 
Four-Digit SIC Manufacturing Industries, 1981-88 
Acquisition  Nonacquisition 





Japanese real GNP growth 
Actual protection 
Probability of protection 
Probability of EC protection 
Probability of AD protection 
h 
Log likelihood 
Restricted log likelihood" 














S.384* * * 
(.711) 
6.288*** 
(1  SOO) 
.666*** 
(.092) 





















.63  I * 
(.164) 
























-  1,066.61 
-  1,412.66 
692.10 
2,392 
.'The coefficients are restricted to slopes equal to zero, intercept equal to the mean of the dependent 
variable, and a and b equal to one. 
***Asymptotic t-test significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
** Asymptotic r-test significant at the 95 percent confidence level. 
*  Asymptotic r-test significant at the 90 percent confidence level. 
engage in certain  types of  FDI in response  to  actual protection, just as we 
have hypothesized differences in FDI with respect to the threat of protection. 
Blonigen (1995) found little relation between protection and acquisition FDI 
and suggests that, if protection tends to occur in industries where foreign firms 
have a competitive  or technological  advantage, they may be less inclined to 
acquire a firm in the host country than to set up their own operations. This 
suggests that foreign firms will use nonacquisition FDI to tariff jump, not ac- 
quisition FDI. 
Columns 2 and 3 of table 3.4 test the effect of different forms of FDI and 
different forms of protectionist threat on equation (4) results. The dependent 
variable is split into acquisition FDI and nonacquisition FDI, and the threat of 
protection variable is split into the threat of AD protection and the threat of EC 76  Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
protection. The results are generally consistent with the predictions of hypoth- 
eses 3 and 4. 
In column 3, there is a significant direct correlation between nonacquisition 
FDI and the threat of AD and EC protection. Acquisition FDI does not show a 
similar strong relation with the threat of protection, particularly the threat of 
EC protection. This supports the notion that foreign firms do not use acquisi- 
tion FDI to respond to protection  that can be politically influenced. Interest- 
ingly, both forms of FDI respond strongly to the probability of AD protection. 
However, nonacqusition FDI responds in a stronger fashion to EC protection 
than AD protection, which is what hypothesis 3 predicts. Interestingly, the two 
sets of  estimates show differential  effects of  actual protection  on different 
forms of FDI. In support of Blonigen (1995), the two sets of estimates show 
that actual protection has a statistically strong direct relation with nonacquisi- 
tion FDI but not with acquisition FDI. In essence, there is little support that 
acquisition FDI is influenced by protection or the threat of protection. 
3.4  Conclusion 
This paper has confirmed that the threat of protection has a substantial effect 
on nonacquisition Japanese FDI in the United States in the 1980s.  In addition, 
there is evidence that threat-responding  FDI by the Japanese had political in- 
tentions of defusing the threat of protection as suggested by quid pro quo the- 
ory. This is seen in the type of  FDI used  to respond  to protectionist  threat 
and the type of protectionist threat that elicited a greater FDI response by the 
Japanese. The success of FDI in defusing the threat of protection is apparently 
determined by the type of FDI used and the type of protection targeted: nonac- 
quisition FDI defuses EC protection. 
But what is the relative effect of actual protection and the threat of protec- 
tion on nonacquisition FDI? In this nonlinear context, coefficient estimates are 
difficult to interpret. In addition, the protection variable is a dummy variable 
taking on the values of only zero or one. One way to generate an estimate of 
these variables’ effect is to simulate the effect of changes in the variables on 
the expected value of the dependent variable. In the case of the dummy vari- 
able, compare the mean at the two different values it may take. Fixing the other 
regressors at their means, and using our estimated coefficients from column 3 
of table 3.4, in-place protection means a 53 percent increase in the expected 
number of FDI occurrences in an industry for a given year. A similar simulation 
shows that, if the threat of an EC affirmative decision rises from 5 to 10 per- 
cent, the expected number of FDI occurrences rises by approximately 32 per- 
cent. An  identical  simulation  with  respect to  the threat  of  AD protection 
increases  expected FDI by approximately  30 percent. These simulations are 
sensitive to the value of the other regressors and starting points for the variable 
in question but  give  some indication  that the threat of  protection  rivals  the 
effect of actual protection on FDI flows. 77  Protectionist Threats and Foreign Direct Investment 
Data Appendix 
Probability of Protection: Equation (2) 
1. Lagged real Japanese import growth. Data on Japanese imports at the four- 
digit SIC level were obtained from a database maintained at the U.S. Interna- 
tional Trade Commission (USITC) and based on official statistics of the U.S. 
Customs Service  and concordances between  Tariff Schedules of  the United 
States Annotated  (TSUSA) product  codes and SIC categories. These figures 
were deflated using industry-specific price indexes taken from statistical tables 
in the Economic Report ofthe President (1994) to get real levels. Finally, last- 
period growth rate over the previous period was calculated. 
2. Lagged  domestic  industry  real shipments  growth.  Data on U.S. domestic 
shipments by  four-digit SIC were taken from various issues of the Census of 
Manufactures.  These figures were  deflated using  industry-specific  price  in- 
dexes taken  from statistical tables in the Economic Report of  the President 
(1994) to get real levels. Finally, last-period growth rate over the previous pe- 
riod was calculated. 
3. Share of Japanese industry  S  imports to total Japanese imports to the United 
States. Data on both Japanese imports and total annual Japanese  imports to 
the United  States at the four-digit  SIC level were obtained  from a database 
maintained  at the USITC, as indicated above. Then, for each industry  i, this 
variable is defined as the ratio of Japanese imports in industry  i in year t to 
total Japanese imports to the United States in year t. 
4. Share of  Japanese industry's imports to industry imports from all countries. 
Data on both  Japanese imports and total  imports  by  industry  to the United 
States at the four-digit SIC level were obtained from a database maintained at 
the USITC, as indicated above. Then, for each industry i, this variable is de- 
fined as the ratio of Japanese imports in industry i in year t to all imports to the 
United States in industry i in year t. 
5. Union presence. This variable is taken from Freeman and Medoff (1979). 
Estimates  were for three-digit  SIC level  and thus repeated  at the four-digit 
level for this study. The variable is defined as percentage of union membership 
of  all workers in column 3 of  Freeman  and Medoff's  table 2, beginning  on 
page  155. 
6.  Industry wage to value added ratio. This variable is taken from various is- 
sues of  the Census of  Manufactures. 
7.  Investigations in industry ofother countries in previous two  years. This vari- 
able is taken from various issues of  The Year in Trade and Annual Report of 78  Bruce A. Blonigen and Robert C. Feenstra 
the USITC. The variable is defined as one if an AD or a CVD petition has been 
filed on other countries' products in industry i in the previous two years. 
8. U.S. real GNP growth. This variable is taken from statistical tables in the 
Economic Report of  the President (1994). 
9. Lagged  FDI. The same source is used for this variable as is used for the 
dependent variable in equation (4) discussed in text, 
Foreign Direct Investment: Equation (4) 
I. R&D expenditures. This variable is defined as company and other (except 
federal) R&D funds as a percentage of net sales in R&D-performing manufac- 
turing companies, by industry, taken from National Science Foundation (1993, 
18). The majority  of  these figures were reported  at the two-digit SIC level 
and then applied to our four-digit-SIC-level data. Some of the more important 
industries, including chemical (SIC 28), primary metals (SIC 33), industrial 
machinery (SIC 33,  electrical machinery  (SIC 36), transportation (SIC 37), 
and instruments (SIC 38), were detailed at the three-digit  SIC level by  the 
National Science Foundation figures. 
2. Yen-dollar exchange rate. This variable is taken from statistical tables in the 
Economic Report of  the President (1994). 
3. Japanese real GNP growth. This variable is taken from the Japan Statisti- 
cal Yearbook. 
4. Keiretsu  linkages. This variable is calculated in similar manner to that used 
by  Lawrence (1993). Industrial Groupings in Japan, 1988/89 (1988) lists ma- 
jor firms, their revenues, and their keiretsu linkages by industry. The keiretsu 
linkage variable was constructed by calculating the percentage of revenues in 
each industry that could be attributed to a firm with keiretsu affiliation. 
5.  Actual protection. This variable is taken from various issues of  The Year in 
Trade and Annual Report of  the USITC. The variable is defined as one if AD 
duties or VERs are in place for industry i in year t and zero otherwise. 
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